Cournot-Bertrand equilibria under two-part tariff contract by Basak, Debasmita






MPRA Paper No. 109588, posted 04 Sep 2021 15:09 UTC
 
 













Abstract: We consider a vertically related market where one quantity setting and another 
price setting downstream firm negotiate the terms of a two-part tariff contract with an 
upstream input supplier. In contrast to the traditional belief, we show that when bargaining is 
decentralised, the price setting firm produces a higher output and earns a higher profit than 
the quantity setting firm. And, when bargaining is centralised, both firms produce the same 
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While a vast majority of studies in oligopoly theory are based on either quantity (Cournot) or 
price (Bertrand) types of competition; mixed competition (i.e., Cournot-Bertrand) has gained 
popularity in recent years. For example, in the small car industry, Honda and Subaru set 
quantities while Saturn and Scion set prices (Tremblay et al. 2013). Flath (2012) shows that 
in 30 out of 70 Japanese industries, companies use some form of mixed competition. Sato 
(1996) argues that in Japanese home electronics industry, Matsushita adopts quantity strategy 
whereas Sanyo employs pricing strategy.  
In a seminal paper, Singh and Vives (1984) show that choosing quantity competition 
is optimal compared to price competition or mixed competition. Considering a setting where 
one firm sets quantity and the other sets price, Temblay and Tremblay (2011) show that the 
quantity setting firm earns higher profit than its price setting rival. In a similar setting, 
Semenov and Tondji (2019) gets the same profit ranking even when both firms invest in cost 
reducing R&D.      
However, the papers above share a common ground where the input market is 
perfectly competitive. It is often found that in many cases input suppliers and the final goods 
producers are involved in two-part tariff vertical pricing contracts (Berto Villa-Boas, 2007 
and Bonnet and Dubois, 2010). Given this backdrop, we consider a vertical structure where 
one quantity setting and another price setting downstream firm negotiate the terms of two-
part tariff contract with an upstream firm either through decentralised or centralised 
bargaining. We formulate a demand function that accounts for both Bowley (1924) type and 
Shubik and Levitan (1980) type demand function and hence, measures the degree of market 
saturation. Our results show that when bargaining is decentralised, the price setting firm 
produces more and earns higher profit than the quantity setting firm whereas when bargaining 




Our results hold both under Bowley (1924) type and Shubik and Levitan (1980) type demand 
function. This is in stark contrast to the existing results alluded earlier.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the model and 
discusses the main results under decentralised and centralised bargaining respectively. 
Section 3 concludes. All proofs are relegated to the appendix.  
 
2. The model 
We consider an economy with two downstream firms, denoted by Di producing differentiated 
products where 𝑖, 𝑗 = 1, 2  and 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗 . The downstream firms require a critical input for 
production that they purchase from a monopoly input supplier, U, through two-part tariff 
contracts involving an up-front fixed-fee and a per-unit price. U produces the inputs at a 
constant marginal cost of production, 0.c   We assume that one unit of input is required to 
produce one unit of the output, and 𝐷  and 𝐷  can convert the inputs to the final goods 
without incurring any further cost.  
We consider a demand equation that combines the demand functions found in 
Bowley (1924) and Shubik and Levitan (1980). The difference between the two approaches is 
the degree of market-expansion effect. While in Bowley’s (1924) formulation of demand 
function the aggregate market size increases with a higher degree of product substitutability, 
the formulation by Shubik and Levitan (1980) reveals that the aggregate market size is 
independent of the degree of product substitutability. We represent the inverse demand 
function as: 
                                                     i i jP a q q                                                               (1) 
where iP  denotes the price and iq  denotes the output of ith downstream firm where , 1, 2i j    




goods are perfect substitutes and if 0   the goods are isolated. The parameter 
 1 1      measures the degree of market expansion, where the upper boundary, 1  , 
corresponds to no market expansion effect, i.e., the market is saturated as in Shubik and 
Levitan (1980) and the lower boundary, 0  , corresponds to full market expansion as in 
Bowley (1924). 
We develop a model of two stage game. At stage 1, U is involved either in a 
decentralised bargaining or centralised bargaining with 1D  and 2D  to determine the terms of 
the two-part tariff contracts involving an up-front fixed-fee, iF , and a per-unit price, iw , 
1, 2i  . At stage 2, 𝐷  competes in quantity and 𝐷  competes in price. We solve the game 
through backward induction. 
2.1 Market competition stage 
We begin our discussion at stage 2 where 𝐷  chooses quantity and 𝐷  chooses price. The 
maximisation problem of the downstream firms yields      Max      Π = 𝜋 − 𝐹                                                                
                                                          1 12 1 1 1a q a P q w q F
 

    
                             (2) 
and,              Max      Π = 𝜋 − 𝐹                                                           
                                                           2 2 2 1 2
1 P w a P q F

                                        (3) 
Maximising (2) and (3) and solving the first order conditions give the equilibrium quantity 
and price of 𝐷  and 𝐷  respectively. 
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2 .D q F    
Next, we solve stage 1 of the game where the equilibrium contract terms are 
determined. We begin our discussion with decentralised bargaining and discuss the 
equilibrium outcomes. We repeat the same exercise under centralised bargaining in a 
subsequent section. For notational reasons, we use superscripts  ,d r  to denote respectively 
the equilibrium values under decentralised and centralised bargaining.  
 
2.2. Decentralised bargaining 
First, assume that bargaining is decentralised where U  bargains with iD  over  ,i iw F  by 
maximising the following generalised Nash bargaining expression: 
                                             Max,    [(𝑤 − 𝑐)𝑞 + 𝐹 ] [𝜋 − 𝐹 ]                                             (6) 
where (𝑤 − 𝑐)𝑞 + 𝐹  and (𝜋 − 𝐹 ) denote respectively the net profit of the upstream and 
downstream firms and   (resp. (1 ) ) shows the bargaining power of the input supplier 
(resp. final goods producers). We restrict our analysis to 𝛽 ∈ (0,1).  
Maximising the above with respect to 𝐹  gives the following 
                                                𝐹 = 12 [𝛽𝜋 − (1 − 𝛽)(𝑤 − 𝑐)𝑞 ]                                                     (7) 




Solving (8), we obtain the equilibrium wholesale prices and fixed fees as1:  
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Using the above, we derive the equilibrium outputs and the profits of the 
downstream firms  
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The following results are immediate from the above.  
 
Proposition 1: (i) The upstream firm charges a lower input price to the price setting 
downstream firm than a quantity setting downstream firm such that 2 1 .
d dw c w   
 
1  Note that, 𝐹 < 0  for 𝛽 < ( ) ( )( )  = 𝛽   meaning that the upstream firm subsidises the 
downstream firm when its bargaining power is small. We, however, assume that 𝛽 > 𝛽  so that it charges a 





(ii) The price setting downstream firm produces a higher output and earns a higher profit 
than the quantity setting downstream firm. 
Note that the price setting downstream firm is charged a wholesale price which is less than 
the upstream firm’s marginal cost, i.e., U  subsidises the price setting firm’s production. As a 
result, the price setting firm, 2D  sets a lower market price which in turn reduces the quantity 
setting firm, 1D ’s output and increases its own profit. This increased profit is then partly 
transferred to the upstream firm via the fixed fee. The opposite is true for the quantity setting 
downstream firm 2 ,D  hence it is charged a wholesale price above U’s marginal cost. 
As the price setting downstream firm faces substantially lower wholesale price, 
naturally, it produces more and earns higher profit than its quantity setting rival.  
 
2.3. Centralised bargaining 
Now, assume that bargaining is centralised. The monopoly input supplier and a representative 
of 1D  and 2D  determine the terms of two-part tariff contract by maximising the following 
generalised Nash bargaining expression: 
                               Max,    (𝑤 − 𝑐)𝑞 + 𝐹 (𝜋 − 𝐹 )                                        (13) 
Maximising the above with respect to 𝐹  gives the following 
                                   𝐹 = 12 𝛽 𝜋 − (1 − 𝛽) (𝑤 − 𝑐)𝑞                                                 (14) 
Substituting (14) in (13), we get the maximisation problem as 




Solving (15), we obtain the equilibrium wholesale prices and fixed fees as2:  
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Next, we calculate the equilibrium outputs and the profits of the downstream firms  
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Comparing the above we get the following. 
 
Proposition 2: (i) The upstream firm charges a lower input price to the price setting 
downstream firm than a quantity setting downstream firm such that 2 1 .
r rc w w   
(ii) The price setting downstream firm and the quantity setting downstream firm produce the 
same level of output.  
(iii) The price setting downstream firm earns a higher profit than the quantity setting 
downstream firm.  
As the upstream firm becomes more opportunistic when bargaining is centralised, it no longer 
subsidises the price setting downstream firm’s production. However, analogous to 
 
2  Note that, 𝐹 < 0  for 𝛽 < [ ( )]( )( )  = ?̅?   meaning that the upstream firm subsidises the 
downstream firm when its bargaining power is small. We, however, assume that 𝛽 > ?̅?  so that it charges a 




Proposition 1(i), it still charges a lower input price to the price setting firm compared to the 
quantity setting firm.  
To analyse Proposition 2(ii) let us recall eq(15). Note that,  
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which is the profit of a monopoly final goods producer, producing both the products at the 
marginal cost of production c. Therefore, maximising (15) is equivalent to maximising the 
profit of a monopoly final goods producer. Hence, it is intuitive that the equilibrium per-unit 
input prices are such that they generate same total output and industry profit under Cournot 
and Bertrand competition. Further, in line with Proposition 1(ii), the price setting firm earns a 
higher profit as it faces a lower input price compared to its quantity setting rival.   
 
3. Conclusion 
We consider a vertical structure where one downstream firm sets quantity and another sets 
price and determine the terms of a two-part tariff contract with an upstream firm either 
through decentralised or centralised bargaining. We find that when bargaining is 
decentralised, the price setting firm produces higher output and earns higher profit than its 
quantity setting rival, whereas under centralised bargaining, both firms produce same output 
but the price setting firm earns a higher profit. This holds true regardless of the degree of 
market saturation.  
 
4. Appendix 
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